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U W E M E I X N E R 
Ontologically Minimal Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic 
The main subject of this paper is not intuitionistic logic but ontologically min-
imal (logical) semantics (in short, OMS): this kind of semantics is merely il-
lustrated by the example of its treatment of intuitionistic logic. As far as the 
meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants is concerned, I use by and large 
the standard interpretation(s) derived from Gödel's original result that intu-
itionistic logic can be embedded in various ways into S4-modal logic. And 
so do most model-theoretical semanticists: standard Kripke-style semantics 
for intuitionistic logic merely explicates Gödel's interpretation in the model-
theoretical way originally developed for modal logic. What's here important 
is not so much the interpretations of the intuitionistic logical constants, but 
rather the way in which they are presented: in an ontologically minimal way. 
Adopting a wording currently much used in other contexts, the slogan of 
O M S in general is this: "Lean Production in Logic". That is, O M S aims at 
cutting down the ontological costs of logic as far as possible. This means in 
particular: 
(1) Total rejection of model-theoretical, in particular set-theoretical means 
(not necessarily for any "ideological", i. e. nominalistic reason, but maybe 
simply out of an interest in how far you can get without them). 
(2) Metatheoretical quantification is restricted to linguistic entities: expres-
sions. 
Thus, O M S goes further than the so-called "truth-value semantics" ad-
vocated by Hugh Leblanc and others. Truth-value semantics respects not 
only expressions, but also sets of expressions, and infinite sets of expressions 
(maximal-consistent sets of formulae), and truth-value-assignments, which 
(set-theoretically) are sets - often infinite - of ordered formula/truth-value 
pairs. This is altogether too much for OMS. 
But how does O M S treat a disguised modal logic, for example, intuition-
istic predicate-logic? First, the operator "K" ("It is known that") is introduced 
into the metalanguage, and the appropriate S4-logical principles for "K" are 
added to the principles of first-order extensional (hence "if, then" and " i f f " are 
truth-functional operators) predicate-logic (as used in the meta-language) and 
to the principles of complete syntactical induction (induction on the length 
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of expressions, the number of logical constants in them etc.). Then by using 
the otherwise unspecified truth-predicate "Tx" truth-laws are formulated for 
the logical constants of the object-language. In those truth-laws x, x', . . . are 
variables for the formulae of the object-language (with or without free vari-
ables; in the latter case, formulae are called "sentences"), z, z ' , . . . variables for 
its variables, y, γ, ... variables for its standard-names; in case χ contains ζ as 
a free variable, x[z] is x; in case it does not, x[z] is the formula Fz—>Fz, where 
F is a particular monadic predicate-letter of the object-language; x[y] results 
from x[z] by replacing ζ everywhere where it is free in x[z] by y. 
Let me present three conjunctions of such truth-laws which, while not be-
ing logically equivalent to each other, nevertheless yield the same intuitionistic 
logical principles for the object language (as will be proved below): 
77 
K(all χ)(Τ-ιχ iff Knot Tx) and 
K(all x)(all x')(Tx&x' iff Tx and Tx') and 
K(all x) (all x')(Txvx' iff Tx or Tx') and 
K(all x)(all x ' ) (Tx-x ' iffK(if Tx, then Tx')) and 
K(all x)(all z)(T(z)x[z] iff K(all y)Tx[y]) and 
K(all x)(all z)(TVzx[z] iff (some y)Tx[y]) and 
K(all x)(if Tx, then KTx). 
T2 
K(all x)(T-x iff Knot KTx) and 
K(all x)(all x')(Tx&x' iffK(KTx and KTx')) and 
K(all x)(all x')(Txvx' iff K(KTx or KTx')) and 
K(all x)(all x ' )(Tx^x' iffK(if KTx, then KTx')) and 
K(all x)(all z)(T(z)x[z] iff K(all y)KTx[y]) and 
K(all x)(all z)(TVzx[z] iff K(some y)KTx[y]). 
T3 
looks just like T2 except that each "T" on the lefthand side of "iff" is replaced 
by "KT". Clearly, T2 and T3 show a uniformity (thus exhibiting an underly-
ing single conception of the logical constants concerned) that is not apparent 
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in Τ1, which moreover has an extra principle which is not characterizing a lo-
gical constant but merely the truth-predicate. Clearly, T l , T 2 and T 3 are not 
logically equivalent to each other; in this sense they are three different inter-
pretations of -i, &, v, ( ) and V. 
The central step in the O M S of intuitionistic logic (and in the O M S of 
any other logic) is the ontologically minimal definition of logical truth (or, 
more neutrally, logical validity): 
D L χ is N-logically true := χ is a sentence, and "Tx" is logically derivable from 
T N (for " Ν " "1", "2" or "3" can be substituted). 
To be clear about this: ' "Tx" is logically derivable from T N ' means the same 
as '"if T N , then Tx" is logically provable'. The remark is necessary, since there 
is also a more general concept of derivability in which, for example, "KA" is 
derivable from "A"; but "if A, then KA" is of course not logically provable. 
( "KTx" can replace "Tx" in the definition-schema DL, since, evidently, "Tx" 
is logically derivable from T N iff "KTx" is thus derivable.) 
The defined concept of logical truth is as precise as is the concept of meta-
theoretical logical derivability that is invoked in its definition. If the latter 
concept is made precise by an exact specification of the metatheoretical logical 
means, so is the former. Notice that there is no talk in the definition of inter-
pretations, models or structures, or even truth-value assignments. The entire 
set-theoretical machinery of standard semantics has simply been passed by. 
So we have an OMS of intuitionistic logic. But is it possible to work 
with this semantics and to obtain interesting semantical results while keeping 
within its strict ontological limits? I will demonstrate that this is possible 
by showing in an ontologically minimal way that the very same formulae 
are 1-, 2- and 3- logically true, and by describing the ontologically minimal 
proof for the soundness and completeness (with respect to 1-logical truth) of 
a (standard) object-language calculus for intuitionistic logic. 
Notice first that T 2 can be logically derived from T l (but not vice versa), 
and T 3 from T 2 (but not vice versa); this is a mere matter of S4-modal 
predicate-logic - metatheoretically applied. Hence we have by DL: 
(1) Every 2-logically true formula is 1-logically true. 
(2) Every 3-logically true formula is 2-logically true. 
Further: Let χ be a sentence (of the object-language). If "Tx" is logically de-
rivable from T l , then also from T3: For T 3 is logically equivalent (provably 
equivalent) to T3* , in which we have "KTx and KTx" ' instead of "K(KTx and 
KTx')", "KTx or KTx" ' instead of "K(KTx or KTx')", "(some y)KTx[y]" in-
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stead of "K(some y)KTx[y]"; but everything else in T3* is as in T3. "T*x" := 
"KTx"; given this definition T3* can be rewritten like this: 
K(all x ) (T*-x iff Knot T*x) and 
K(all x)(all x')(T*x&x' iff T*x and T V ) and 
K(all x)(all x')(T*xvx' i f fT*x or T V ) and 
K(all x)(all x ' )(T*x^x' i f fK( i fT*x , then T V ) ) and 
K(all x)(all z)(T*(z)x[z] ifFK(all y )TV[y ] ) and 
K(all x)(all z)(T*Vzx[z] ifF(some y )TV[y ] ) and 
K(all x)(if T V , then KT*x)· 
(The last sentence is - by the definition of " T V ' - a metatheoretical logical 
theorem.) Since T3* can be written in this form, it is clear: if "Tx" is logically 
derivable from T l , "TV" is logically derivable from T3*; the derivation from 
T1 can be simply copied, replacing "T" everywhere by "T*". But if "TV" is 
logically derivable from T3*, "Tx" is logically derivable from T3. Hence we 
have what was to be proved: If "Tx" is logically derivable from T l , "Tx" is 
logically derivable from T3. 
Hence we obtain using DL: 
(3) Every 1-logically true formula is 3-logically true. 
Nothing further than (1), (2), (3) is needed for showing that the very same 
formulae are 1-, 2- and 3-logically true. 
Now let IPL be a standard object-language calculus of intuitionistic 
predicate-logic. 
The soundness of IPL with respect to 1-logical truth (hence also with re-
spect to 2- and 3-logical truth) is shown by demonstrating that a given proof 
of a sentence χ in IPL (which exists if χ is provable in IPL) can always be trans-
formed into a logical derivation of "Tx" from T l (which imparts that χ is 
1-logically true). This is done by showing in the first place that for all ax-
ioms x' of IPL "Tx"' is logically derivable from T l , and in the second place 
that every (basic) rule of IPL is such that if the truth of its premises is logically 
derivable from T l , then also the truth of its conclusion. 
The completeness of IPL with respect to 1-logical truth is a more difficult 
matter to prove in an ontologically minimal way. The easiest way is the fol-
lowing: Assume χ is 1 -logically true, hence χ is a sentence, and "Tx" is logically 
128 Section 1: Logic 
derivable from T l , hence there is a logical derivation of "Tx" from T l . Recon-
struct this derivation as an object-language proof of tr(x) in a calculus S4PL of 
S4-modal predicate-logic, where tr(x) is the translation of χ into the language 
of S4PL. The translation is inductively defined as subsequently specified: 
tr(p) = Np, for all (atomic formulae) p. For all x, x', z: 
tr(-ix)=N-itr(x), tr(x&x')=tr(x)&tr(x'), tr(xvx')=tr(x)vtr(x'), 
tr(x—i-x') =N(tr(x) —Hr(x')), tr((z)x[z])=N(z)tr(x[z]), tr(Vzx[z])= Vztr(x[z]). 
Since tr(x) is provable in S4PL, χ itself is provable in IPL (q.e.d). The lemma 
"For all sentences x: if tr(x) is provable in S4PL, then χ is provable in IPL" fol-
lows from a result which Kurt Schütte obtained in a purely syntactical, hence 
ontologically minimal manner (Schütte 1968, 33ff.)· 
The proof of the lemma having been taken care of by Schütte, the one dif-
ficult point remaining is how to reconstruct a logical derivation of "Tx" from 
T l as a proof of tr(x) in the calculus S4PL of S4-modal predicate-logic: 
(1) Bring the derivation into indirect form with minimal assumptions: 
Start with "not Tx" (other assumptions to be refuted may occur later), and, 
over all reducing the logical complexity of x, apply merely the relevant sin-
gular instance of the truth- law of T l concerned in each case as an assump-
tion (and the inferences of metatheoretical S4-modal predicate-logic), until 
you have logically refuted "not Tx" on the basis of T l , or rather: on the basis 
of the singular instances of T l actually needed for the refutation (their num-
ber is finite). (This step eliminates the occurrences of variables for formulae 
and variables for variables from the derivation.) 
(2) For the name of every formula (which conveniently is the formula 
itself) in the system of derivations obtained in (1) (call this system "β") put 
the name of its translation (the translation-formula itself; often merely a part 
of a formula needs to be replaced by the relevant part of its translation), 
omit the truth-predicate from β, and for "not" put "->", for "K" put "N", 
r u ι » «ο Γ « » « » Γ « · r 1 » « » Γ « · Γ Γ » « » J Γ II 
tor and & , tor or ν , tor it, then —> , tor irr «->· ; and hnally: 
for "(all)" put " ( )" , for "(some )" put "V", for y, y7, . . . put an appropriate 
object-language-variable (preserving wellformedness and blurring no distinc-
tions). This gives you β*: a system of (formally strict) S4PL-derivations, 
since ß-assumptions are copied as ß*-assumptions, and every metatheoretical 
logical step in β is copied in β* by the corresponding deductive step of S4PL 
(which can always be justified by an S4PL-theorem and Modus Ponens). The 
Τ1-based assumptions of β, however, have turned into trivial S4PL-theorems 
of the form N ( A o A ) (for example: if the following singular instance of the 
negation-law of T l is an assumption of ß: "K(T->Fa iff Knot TFa)", we have 
in ß* "N(tr(-iFa)oN-itr(Fa))", which is of course identical to "N(N-iNFa Ή· 
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N-iNFa)"); hence they can all be eliminated from β*. This leaves in β* merely 
the copies of the assumptions of β which are reduced to absurdity in β; those 
copies, however, are also reduced to absurdity in β*. Hence β* is an indirect 
S4PL-argument for tr(x). 
(3) Being a system of S4PL-derivations, β* is not a formal S4PL-proof. 
However, by applying the relevant meta-theorems for the calculus S4PL 
(which can be proved in a purely syntactical manner), it can be shown that, 
given β*, there must exist an S4PL-proof of tr(x) - an S4PL-proof that can 
actually be constructed - although laboriously - using the material presented 
in β*. 
I presume at least some readers will feel dissatisfied with this way of 
proving a calculus of intuitionistic predicate-logic to be semantically com-
plete — not for a lack of rigor in it, but because they feel that the proof is 
somewhat "uninteresting". They should first take a look at Schütte's proof of 
the lemma, which is by no means "uninteresting" (it is much more difficult 
to prove the Gödelian embeddability assertions for intuitionistic logic in a 
purely syntactical manner than by model-theoretical semantical means, and, 
indeed, not many logicians have tried their hand in this). But setting this 
apart: the greater the apparent distance between the syntactical concept of 
provability in a calculus and the semantical concept of logical truth (both 
for object-language formulae), the more interesting we are bound to find a 
proof which shows that they are after all co-extensional. In OMS, however, 
the apparent distance between the two concepts is as a rule (not only in the 
case of intuitionistic logic) small, and accordingly the way of proving them 
co-extensional seems pedestrian. 
O n the other hand, the way of defining logical truth in O M S (logical truth 
as logical derivability of truth from certain truth-laws) is just as intuitively 
satisfying as the usual model-theoretical manner of defining it (logical truth 
as truth in all interpretations, which are set-theoretical structures of a certain 
kind). (It's worth investigating how the two conceptions of logical truth or 
validity are in general related to each other; ontologically minimal logical truth 
always implies model-theoretical logical truth; but does model-theoretical lo-
gical truth always imply ontologically minimal logical truth?) And the idea 
that we don't really capture the meaning of a logical constant - especially a 
modal one, disguised or not - unless we reconstruct this meaning in model-
theoretical terms is just about as wellfounded as the idea of 19th-century phys-
ics that we don't really understand a physical phenomenon unless we provide 
a mechanical model for it. This suggests that the interestingness of model-
theoretical, say, Henkin-style proofs of semantical completeness is somewhat 
artificial in nature. It is the product of playing the game of logical semantics 
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according to certain rules which, after all, are not absolutely forced on us. It's 
like going by helicopter - certainly an exhilarating experience - when you can 
reach your destination in no time by foot. 
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